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THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL AND ITS 
DIPLOMACY – WHAT WE KNOW ALREADY 
On 1 December 2019, Ursula von der Leyen took 
over the office as new European Commission 
President for the mandate 2019 to 2024. As early 
as day 11 of her time in office, her Commission 
presented the new “European Green Deal” 
(EGD), which von der Leyen herself called the 
“man on the moon moment” for Europe. The 
EGD provides a comprehensive and ambitious 
strategy and action roadmap for the EU to reach 
climate neutrality in 2050, including concrete 
actions such as proposals for an EGD 
Investment Plan, a Just Transition Mechanism, a 
new Climate Law, a European Climate Pact, a 
European Industrial Strategy, a Circular 
Economy Action Plan, a Farm-to-Fork strategy 
and an EU Biodiversity Strategy. The EGD 
thereby touches upon a considerable number of 
policy areas and sectors, including energy, industry, 
construction, mobility/transport, trade, biodiversity, 
agriculture/food sector and environmental 
protection. With expectations set this high, EU 
policy-makers and observers have been 
speculating about whether the EGD ambitions 
will actually materialize into such a significant 
“man on the moon moment” for Europe’s 
climate ambitions or whether the rhetoric 
ambitions will fail to deliver what they promise.1  
One element of the EGD that has received 
comparatively less attention is the ambition for 
the EU to be a “global leader” by paralleling 
internal ambitious transition efforts with a 
“stronger ‘green deal diplomacy’ focused on 
convincing and supporting others to take on their 
share of promoting more sustainable 
development”.2  So far, very little is known about 
the details of such a Green Deal Diplomacy and 
how it will relate to previously formulated EU 
One of the innovations of the new 
European Commission’s proposal of a 
European Green Deal (EGD) is to build 
a “Green Deal Diplomacy”. While this 
ambition has not yet materialized, the 
proposed new diplomacy does not 
emerge in an empty space, as the EU has 
already started to develop explicit 
climate and energy diplomacies since 
2011 and 2015 respectively. As such, it will 
be essential for the EGD diplomacy to 
learn from past successes and missed 
opportunities of the previous attempts to 
formulate and implement EU external 
ambitions in policy areas related to the 








sectoral diplomacies, such as climate or energy 
diplomacy.  
The EGD Communication spends approximately 
two and a half of the total 22 pages on this global 
dimension. Overall, the section remains rather 
broad in content; a clear focus on various tools, 
levels and internal/external coordination efforts 
is missing. As such, the section includes calls for 
intensified work between the High Representative/Vice-
President (HR/VP), Commission and Member States 
“to mobilise all diplomatic channels both bilateral 
and multilateral” (mentioning levels such as the 
UN, G7, G20, WTO and partners in the Western 
Balkans and Neighbourhood, EU-China interactions, 
EU-Africa/African Union interactions explicitly). 
It equally calls for forging “green alliances” 
through “diplomatic and financial tools” with 
Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia and 
the Pacific. It calls for more integrated thinking 
about climate and interrelated policies such as 
environmental, security and defence issues, etc. It 
also mentions the EU’s role as a market power in 
setting global standards and as a tool to engage 
with trading partners. Furthermore, the EU’s role 
as a global donor of climate finance is stressed 
including calls to strengthen both public and 
private funds.  
The Annex/Road Map circulated alongside the 
communication includes four similarly broad 
actions for 2019 and 2020: (1) “continue to lead 
international climate and biodiversity negotiations, 
further strengthening the international policy 
frameworks”, (2) “strengthen the EU’s Green 
Deal Diplomacy in cooperation with Member 
States”, (3) “bilateral efforts to induce partners to 
act and to ensure comparability of action and 
polices”, and (4) a “Green Agenda for the 
Western Balkans”. For obvious reasons, action 
point two is particularly interesting to reflect 
upon here, since a “strengthen[ing]” of a Green 
Deal Diplomacy will require a formulation of 
such a diplomacy together with EU Member 
States in the first place, likely to take place in the 
Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) setting. So far, this 
ambition for 2020 has not materialized in public 
outcomes. 
Furthermore, only one day after the presentation 
of the EGD, the new HR/VP Josep Borrell 
published a blog post on “The EU Green Deal – 
A Global Perspective”,3 illustrating the key role 
that the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) envisages playing in the development of 
a Green Deal Diplomacy. While the blog post 
itself does not include concrete tools or actions, 
it acknowledges the “geopolitical” dimension of 
the climate change challenge and states the 
HR/VP’s ambition to “embark on this new phase 
of ‘Green Deal diplomacy’ (…) using all the 
means at [the EU’s] disposal – from trade policy 
and technical assistance, to capacity building and 
development cooperation, as well as our crisis 
management tools when needed”.  
GREEN DEAL DIPLOMACY: WHAT TO 
LEARN FROM PAST DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS? 
While the European Commission’s new team has 
published a number of policy documents with 
highly ambitious language on what a Green Deal 
Diplomacy should achieve, it has remained 
substantially vague on concrete tools, 
coordination mechanisms and steps of 
implementation. Revisiting efforts on diplomatic 
ambitions on EU climate and energy diplomacy 
from 2011 to today can help understand the 
critical points for developing a new Green Deal 
Diplomacy. Built on an analysis of previous EU 
policy documents, secondary literature and 
extensive interview data,4 I argue that whether a 
“man on the moon moment” for the EU’s global 
Green Deal ambitions will materialise depends 
on how the diplomacy will deal with the 
complexities of a comprehensive strategy like the 
European Green Deal. Key will be the five 
following factors: the internal policies to be 
included; the coordination of potentially 
conflicting policy components; the level of 








EU actors; and the extent to which strategies will 
be tailored towards the diverse targets of EU 
diplomacy. 
 A) GREEN DEAL DIPLOMACY: WHAT’S IN 
THE NAME, AND WHAT IS NOT?  
As explained above, the European Green Deal aims 
to be a comprehensive strategy, integrating a number 
of diverse policy areas. Yet, which policy areas will 
be included in the external comprehensive strategy 
that could be the Green Deal Diplomacy – and 
which will not? The EGD sets out ambitions in the 
policy areas of climate, energy, economy, 
environment, biodiversity, agriculture, industry, 
mobility, social justice and more. For all of these, 
there is some level of EU external engagement 
already – be it the EU’s role in multilateral climate 
and environmental negotiations or the EU’s various 
trade and partnership agreements – and often policy 
area-specific actions are aligned, with for example the 
promotion of green growth models being part of 
climate diplomatic outreach. As such, clarifying how 
the EGD diplomacy brings various external activities 
together in one comprehensive strategy, thereby 
standing out from previous diplomatic attempts, will 
be essential.  
The level of ambition of the comprehensive EGD 
can provide a point of reference for third countries 
to follow the EU’s level of ambition more broadly – 
as this was for example stressed at the recent EU-
Ukraine summit in October 2020.5 Yet, referring to 
the EGD’s comprehensive ambitions is not a 
diplomatic outreach strategy of its own, but rather 
can put the EGD at risk to become an empty shell 
for third countries to pick and choose which ‘green’ 
components to follow. For a strong, new Green 
Deal Diplomacy to emerge clear, consistent policy 
objectives and instruments relating to the specific 
components of the EGD will have to be formulated. 
The examples of previously formulated EU climate 
and energy diplomacy strategies in the FAC6 
illustrate how this is essential for the effectiveness of 
diplomatic outreach.  
For climate diplomacy, having had regular and 
extensive conclusions on how to spread ambitious 
climate action towards various actors, emphasizing 
instruments and policy synergies (e.g. energy, human 
rights, trade, security, development) has provided a 
relatively clear framework of external engagement. 
For energy diplomacy, objectives are less clear, with 
actions mostly focusing on advancing internal 
coordination among Member States and EU 
institutions and building on existing energy 
partnership/dialogue formats. As such, clear choices 
on which concrete policy-area specific objectives and 
external instruments are to be included in the EGD 
diplomacy will be essential for it to develop into a 
meaningful, comprehensive outreach strategy, and 
not into a paper tiger of stated ambitions for a 
multitude of areas of external engagement. 
B) SYNERGIES ONLY? INTERLINKED, YET 
DIFFERENT EGD POLICIES 
As outlined above, the Green Deal approaches the 
goal of reaching climate neutrality by 2050 in an 
integrated manner. This approach can, on the one 
hand, be a key strength of the Green Deal and its 
diplomacy, since it allows for synergetic, joined-up 
thinking – which also the EU Global Strategy (2016) 
calls for.7 As experiences from EU climate and 
energy diplomacy show, there are often important 
synergies between policies and by extension 
diplomatic outreach objectives (e.g. promotion of 
renewable energies), which could easily be 
overlooked or not used to the fullest potential in 
separate diplomacy formulation and implementation 
processes. Previous FAC conclusions (2017-2020) 
have stressed these synergies repeatedly. As one 
interviewed EU diplomat said: “EU climate and 
energy policies cannot be separated, they are 
inextricably linked”.8 Designing these synergies more 
explicitly into a new, coherent EGD diplomatic 
strategy can provide a crucial step in advancing 
previous diplomatic attempts. 
Yet, despite ‘inextricable links’ between policy areas, 








become visible when the policy objectives of 
individual diplomacies conflict: Take, for example, 
the case of an energy transit or supply country to the 
EU. While climate objectives will surely play a role in 
political or sectoral dialogues, the energy objective of 
security of supply is likely to overweigh climate 
concerns in such direct interactions. Such distorted 
synergies can stem from disagreement on policy 
objectives among Member States, as well as from 
variation in objectives towards specific countries, as 
the above example illustrates. For this reason, a 
Green Deal Diplomacy needs to not only take close 
account of potential synergies between policy areas 
to be included, but also address competing 
objectives and potential incompatibilities between 
these policy areas. 
C) SYNERGIES ONLY? INTERLINKED, YET 
DIFFERENT EGD POLICIES 
Closely related to the above points is the crucial 
question of whether EU Member States will show 
any appetite to formulate a meaningful diplomatic 
vision for Green Deal Diplomacy. The most recent 
indicator for this are the latest climate diplomacy 
conclusions by the FAC of 20 January 2020,9  which 
seem not too promising in this aspect. The 
conclusions mention the EGD ambitions once, 
namely in the introductory paragraph in which the 
Council takes note of a number of policy 
developments, such as the IPCC Special Report. In 
this context, the FAC notes that “the European 
Commission presented its European Green Deal” 
(ibid., p. 2). Furthermore, climate change was 
addressed during one of the most recent European 
Council meetings (15-16 October 2020).10 In its 
conclusions the objective of climate neutrality by 
2050 and the role of “active European climate 
diplomacy” (p. 3) are mentioned, however the EGD 
and its potential diplomatic dimension are not 
explicitly referred to. The two conclusions on issues 
so closely related to an EGD diplomacy could have 
represented an opportunity for Member States to 
signal good-will towards this project at both Council 
levels. The fact that in both cases, however, EGD 
diplomacy ambitions were left unmentioned hints at 
low Member States’ interest in the project so far. 
The role of Member States’ support for EU 
diplomacies is particularly crucial, as many of the 
EGD policies are shared competences (Art. 4 
TFEU), making the EGD diplomacy’s success 
highly dependent on whether Member States can 
agree on its design. When looking at the past 
formulation of EU climate and energy diplomatic 
ambitions, there have been significant differences in 
support for climate (“top-level political support”11) 
and energy (“constrained by Member States’ 
sovereignty concerns”12 ) diplomacy. Divergences in 
positions originate from differences in national 
energy/climate characteristics (e.g. energy markets, 
greenhouse gas emissions) as well as in climate 
ambitions: The Climate Change Performance Index 
(CCPI) ranks eleven EU countries as ‘high 
performers’ (e.g. Sweden), yet for example Poland 
and Bulgaria rank ‘very low’ in climate policy 
performance.13 This is also reflected in varying 
national public interest in climate matters: While 48 
percent of Eurobarometer respondents in Sweden 
consider climate change as one of the “most 
important issues facing the EU”, this share is only at 
10 percent in Bulgaria.14 As such, Member States’ 
support can be expected to vary significantly in the 
level of ambition and policy integration for an EGD 
diplomacy proposal. 
The previous formulation of climate and energy 
diplomacy illustrates that creating a new term for 
diplomatic outreach in itself is not sufficient to 
translate into diplomatic action, but it requires 
Member States’ consensus in order to be meaningful. 
For an EGD diplomacy to be formulated and 
implemented, it will therefore be crucial to have 
Member States’ support not just for the various 
components on the internal dimensions of the 
Green Deal (e.g. debates about the proposed EU 
Climate Law15) but also support on the instruments 
and priorities of a potential Green Deal Diplomacy 








D) INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY: WHO WILL 
BE RESPONSIBLE FOR GREEN DEAL 
DIPLOMACY? 
A fundamental point for all EU policy initiatives lies 
in the risk of turf wars among EU institutions on the 
question of ‘who’ will be responsible for EU policies. 
This question will not only be at the heart of the 
process leading to the formulation of Green Deal 
Diplomacy but also its consequent implementation. 
Within the EU’s complex institutional set-up, a 
number of institutions will have to arrange various 
responsibilities ranging from who holds the pen in 
drafting, who wants to (or has to) give input in the 
process, who holds the relevant funds and who 
steers implementation. This will again depend on the 
concrete policies which will fill the Green Deal 
Diplomacy box; yet, on a working level, the usual 
suspects to steer such a diplomacy could be one or 
more of the Commission’s DGs (i.e. DG Climate 
Action and/or DG Energy), or the EEAS’ thematic 
structures (i.e. climate and energy diplomacy 
coordination units, Ambassadors at Large for 
Climate Diplomacy, Green Diplomacy Network). At 
the higher level, this question translates into whether 
Frans Timmermans, Executive Vice-President 
responsible for the EGD, or Josep Borrell, HR/VP, 
will be the main holder of the Green Deal’s 
diplomatic pen.  
Past research on EU climate and energy diplomacy 
has shown16 that responsibilities for implementing 
the two respective diplomacies have been quite 
widespread: in addition to the above mentioned 
‘usual suspects’ steering climate/energy diplomacy 
(namely DG Climate Action, DG Energy and the 
EEAS), other Commission DGs such as DGs 
Environment, International Cooperation and 
Development (DEVCO), Research and Innovation, 
Trade, Neighbourhood and Enlargement 
Negotiations, etc. were often involved as 
counterparts steering EU diplomatic outreach. This 
institutional diversity does not have to affect the 
efficiency of the EU’s outreach per se, as each service 
provides policy/region-specific expertise (and 
instruments). Yet, if decentralization is too high, it 
can weaken the overall coherence of outreach. It will 
therefore be essential to centralize coordination (e.g. 
in a Green Deal Diplomacy coordinating team in the 
Commission or EEAS) holding responsibility to 
mainstream messages and to provide clear structures 
of coordination among all involved services for 
steering EGD diplomacy (e.g. regular inter-service 
meetings, use of platforms like the Green Diplomacy 
Network). 
E) GREEN DEAL DIPLOMACY TOWARDS 
WHOM? TAKING GEOGRAPHICAL 
DIFFERENTIATION SERIOUSLY? 
The EGD Communication formulates the ambition 
to develop “tailor-made geographic strategies” (p. 
20). The idea of pursuing “tailor-made” strategies 
towards third countries is not new in itself, and was 
already previously mentioned in climate diplomacy 
conclusions in 2017 and 2020. To include this aspect 
into the newly developed diplomacy will however be 
a particular challenge due to the cross-cutting nature 
of policy areas to be included: Taking different local 
contexts of diplomatic partners into consideration is 
already complex enough in one single diplomacy 
area alone. For example, previous climate diplomacy 
conclusions often identified two groups of outreach 
partners: targeting G20 countries as the ones with 
high greenhouse gas emission responsibility on the 
one hand; and supporting developing countries as 
often highly climate vulnerable partners on the other. 
For energy diplomacy, outreach towards 
neighbourhood and transit/supply countries was 
particularly emphasized – which doesn’t necessarily 
align with climate diplomacy priorities. 
These two examples illustrate possible dimensions of 
how a differentiated EU diplomacy towards specific 
(groups of) third countries can look. Other 
dimensions of differentiation could be the existence 
of partnership or trade agreements, the political 
system at stake, historical ties with the EU and/or 
individual Member States, specific environmental or 








“tailor-made geographic strategies” is therefore one 
thing, but there will need to be an in-depth reflection 
exercise on how such strategies can entail different 
components not just for different target regions but 
also for the different policy instruments included in 
an EGD diplomacy. This reflection process needs to 
include many EU actors across Commission DGs, 
EEAS Brussels headquarters and EU Delegations, 
relevant Council of the EU formations, its sub-
structures and Member States’ actors across levels 
(e.g. development, foreign, trade ministries, 
embassies) as well as ideally local actors from various 
regional contexts, in order to not only take into 
account the EU’s vision of diplomatic differentiation 
but also the counterpart’s visions. The result of this 
process could be a diverse toolbox with country- or 
region-specific components, clearly outlining the 
target-specific diplomatic instruments and narratives 
at the EU’s disposal. 
CONCLUSIONS 
For a European Green Deal Diplomacy to develop 
and materialize in a substantial manner, it will be 
essential to acknowledge that this new diplomatic 
effort does not start in a void of EU diplomatic 
outreach. Climate and to a lesser extent energy 
diplomacies have been formulated and implemented 
at the EU level since 2011. As such, a new EGD 
diplomacy should be built on a careful review 
process of best practices and missed opportunities of 
past EU (climate and energy) diplomacies.  
An EGD diplomacy could build on the success story 
of EU climate diplomacy, as the latter has enjoyed 
Member States’ support so far and has been able to 
expand in scope over the past decade. Yet, if an 
EGD diplomacy wants to take an integrative 
approach seriously, simply adding a few items to 
climate diplomacy and relabelling it will not be 
enough. As the attempt to synergize with energy 
diplomacy has shown, integrated diplomacies only 
work in some settings (e.g. promoting renewable 
energy targets), but they can also run counter (e.g. 
energy security interests versus climate targets) – or 
simply not assume shape, if Member States’ support 
is missing. Creating a new Green Deal diplomacy can 
however provide a welcome opportunity for the EU 
to revisit these past efforts and create a more 
effective, coherent diplomatic strategy and toolbox 
to influence third actors towards the green 
transformation that the EGD envisions.  
Initiating the debate on how the EGD could 
translate into a coherent diplomacy is a pressing 
matter, considering the EGD’s implications for 
ongoing EU internal processes (e.g. MFF, EU 
Recovery Plan, Climate Law) and for the EU’s role 
in the international arena (e.g. postponed COP26 in 
2021). To this end, the drafting process should start 
by developing a vision of what policies the EGD 
diplomacy will include and how it will impact the 
existing practice of EU diplomacy. There is a need to 
carefully consider the various internal dynamics in 
terms of EU competences at stake in the various 
EGD policy areas with relevant external dimensions, 
by extension the available instruments and various 
EU internal actors to be involved in the steering and 
implementation process. Furthermore, EGD 
diplomacy cannot be designed in a compartmentalized 
manner, as it was the practice over the past decade 
with diplomacies on climate action and energy being 
designed separately. This also means taking into 
account both synergies and potential 
incompatibilities between policies and diplomatic 
outreach in advance. Taking this argument one step 
further, it will not be enough to decide on one 
general ‘toolbox’ and priorities of EGD diplomacy, 
but the ambition of tailor-made strategies should 
take the true differences between outreach issues and 
outreach partners in terms of capacities, needs, and 
receptiveness seriously. 
The drafting process of the EGD diplomacy 
proposal should take place in a balanced 
coordination exercise with shared ownership of the 
EEAS and HR/VP on the one hand, and the 
European Commission, meaning relevant expert 
Commissioners and DGs, and the Council of the 








Council working parties) on the other. Close 
coordination with and reflection processes involving 
Member States representatives on this original 
proposal will be a sine qua non in this process, since 
without a shared vision about the EU’s outreach on 
the Green Deal ambitions, it is likely for the 
Commission’s ideas to turn into a paper tiger. One 
should thereby keep in mind that EGD diplomacy 
does not need to entail exclusive EU-level activities, 
but could (or should) also include increased 
information sharing and tools to create synergies 
between existing instruments at national levels.  
This process could ideally lead to EGD diplomacy 
conclusions to be passed not just in the Foreign 
Affairs Council, but also to be discussed and 
endorsed at the level of the European Council as well 
as in other relevant EU institutions such as the 
European Parliament. This process would mean 
maximum inclusion of the relevant European and 
EU-level actors, ideally leading to shared ownership 
and thereby effectiveness of the new diplomatic 
ambitions under the EGD. If these conditions are 
met, the new Green Deal Diplomacy ambitions 
could strengthen the EU’s existing diplomatic 
outreach on climate action and the energy transition. 
Whether they will end up being a true game-changer 
or “man on the moon moment” for EU diplomacy, 
will remain to be seen. 
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